How did the Ottoman Empire affect the development of Balkan and Middle East Identities?
The administrative institutions of the multiethnic Ottoman Empire had a significant effect on the emergence of identity in the Balkans and the Middle East. While other multiethnic empires like the Habsburg Empire acted to coerce minorities to adopt a uniform state religion, the Ottoman Empire tolerated Roman Catholic, Orthodox Christians and Jewish minorities by organizing them into religious millets with religious leadership regardless of their language and ethnicity[i]. The relative autonomy provided by these millets combined with the penetration of Western European nationalism created the backdrop for the emergence of identity in the Balkans and Middle East.
The increased involvement of Western Europe in the Ottoman Empire can be divided into three areas: economics, religion and education[ii]. Non-Muslim individuals restricted from land ownership composed the merchant class. These merchants helped introduce the Nation State and Nationalism into the Ottoman Empire through their contacts with Western Europe. Also, Western European Countries began to sponsor parallel religious groups or millets within the empire. France claimed to support the interests of Roman Catholics and Russia expressed a similar claim to Orthodox Christians. Different denominations funded not only churches but hospitals, schools and printing presses.[iii]
The legacies of the Ottoman Empire have made nationalism synonymous with religion. As the concept of the homogenous nation state became more familiar within the Ottoman Empire, religion became the primary marker of nationess[iv]. The theoretical model of one state one nation manifested itself in a reality of one state several nations. As a result, identity became exclusive in the post Ottoman territories and as assimilation failed, the existence of minorities had become an obstacle hindering the creation of the nation state[v].
The failure of assimilation began a more extreme process of divergence in the transition from a multiethnic empire to a nation state during the inter war period. Ethnic cleansing and unmixing were utilized to solve the problem of national minorities by removing them from a territory all together[vi]. The 1923 Treaty of Lausanne in which Greece and Turkey agreed to exchange their respective 1.5 million minority populations became a model for mass forced migrations[vii].
As Charles Igrao argues, the East is different from the West[viii]. This is largely due to the different traditions of government and institutions from which the East has evolved. The Ottoman Empire allowed greater local and regional autonomy based on the millet system. This encouraged autonomous cultural development rooted in religion. As a result, what had become traditional components of identity in Western Europe like language didnt have the same impact in the Ottoman multi ethnic empire[ix]. Bosnian Orthodox Serbs, Catholic Croats and Bosnian Muslims all speak the same language and descend from a common ancestry but have different national identities[x]).
The nation state model established by the French Revolution undermined the ethnic coexistence of the Ottoman Multinational Empire. The nation state model first penetrated those regions with clearly dominant ethnic groups like Serbia in 1815, Greece in 1829, Romania in 1858 and Bulgaria in 1878[xi]. The Balkan Wars from 1912-1918 were an attempt to extend these nation states into ethnically diverse polyglot areas of the Ottoman Empire like Macedonia, Thrace, Kosovo, Dobruja and Bosnia that contained populations of there respective ethnic groups[xii].
Multi ethnicity is the solution not the problem[xiii] while maintaining that ethnic coexistence becomes possible in polyglot states where the balance of power is more evenly distributed as opposed to one group enjoying an absolute majority. Ingrao cites as evidence; North American cities like New York and Los Angeles where multiethnic communities are stabilized by a polyglot balance of power[xiv]. among ethnic groups. However, other non polyglot cities in the United States where absolute majorities and minorities do exist also experience this stability. Therefore, it could be argued that a polyglot composition is not a necessary variable in determining successful coexistence, even more so in the Balkans and Middle East.
Greece is arguably the best and most stable example of western democracy in the Balkans. The Modern Greek race is composed of Greeks, Turks, Albanians, Romanians, assorted Slavs and others[xv]. Kaplan quotes Greece Former Foreign Minister Ioannis Kapsis to suggest Greeces Balkaness or intolerance and exclusivity towards its minorities. No Turks live in Greecethere only happen to be Greeks who happen to be Muslim and speak Turkish.nor are there Macedonians[xvi]. However, in reality this quote depicts Greeces movement towards an inclusive, civic nation. Similair America; composed of Catholic, Spanish speaking Americans, Muslim Arab Americans and Buddhist Chinese Americans; Greece is also composed of multi ethnic and religious groups under the umbrella of a Greek Nation.
Conclusion: The legacies of the Ottoman Empire and of Western European Nationalism continue to define the emergence of identity in the Balkans and Middle East. Attempts to homogenize and divergence to the one nation one state model have ranged from assimilation to ethnic cleansing. As Ingrao argues, the East is Different. Western models of the Nation State cannot be readily applied in an area where autonomous cultural development is so deeply rooted in religion, even in a Polyglot context.
Tuesday, November 13, 2007
Understanding the Difficulties in Spreading Democracy and State Building
Understanding the Difficulties in Spreading Democracy and State-Building.
Perhaps the nearest concept to imperial law in international politics is the Theory of Democratic Peace. This theory states that dyad democratic relationships are relatively unlikely to engage in militarized confrontation (Oneal and Russett, 267)[i]. However, transitional democracies are known to be more violent, unstable and conflict prone. Democratic Peace is limited to relationships among mature democracies the process of democratization makes fledging democracies more prone to conflict (Oneal, Russett 270; [Mansfield and Snyder])[ii]. Premature institutions, lack of endogenous socialization of democratic norms, transitions in security systems and the presence of lags help explain the existence of instabilities during transitional democratic periods. Ultimately premature institutions yield power to ideological individual leadership which often acquires a radical orientation in attempt to pursue realization of a democratic reality.
Regimes facilitate Cooperation from discord
One role of institutions is its purpose in converting discord into cooperation where harmony does not exist (Keohane, 51-52[iii]).Accordingly; Democratic Peace requires the facilitation of regimes to establish cooperation necessary to create democratic peace. The institutions and regimes of transitional democracies often fail in facilitating cooperation, thus lending to the instability of transitional democracies.
Keohane explains international conflict as arising from interdependence, resulting from democratic states expansion abroad as a means of protecting their own domestic economic and security interests. Interdependence leads democratic governments to expand state activity in order to protect their own citizens (Keohane, P.5,6)[iv]. Autocratic or non democratic governments are often pressured exogenously to acquire democratic reforms. This is often referred to top down state building. When this process is established exogenously, it often results in discord. This discord manifests itself in the transitional democratic period.
In a non hegemonic system, states that share mutual interests and shared perceptions make cooperation possible through the facilitation of international regimes (Keohane, 56-57)[v]. Neo liberal Institutionalism would cite the absence of or lack in regime integration or coordination in transitional democracies to explain their conflict prone tendencies. Neoliberal Institutionalists agree that Democratic Peace is established through cooperation and shared interests but also through the incorporation of these factors into laws and institutions non hegemonic cooperation is possible, and that it is facilitated through international regimes (Keohane p.50)[vi]. While transitional democracies may identify common principles with other democracies, the institutions of a transitional democracy while still young and undeveloped are incapable of facilitating cooperation. The mere existence of common interests is not enough [for cooperation]: institutions that reduce uncertainty and limit asymmetries in information must also exist. (Keohane 12-13[vii]).
A Neoliberal Institutionalist systems level of analysis would define a regime as a set of mutual expectations, rules and regulations, plans, organizational energies and financial commitments which have been accepted by a group of states. (Keohane. P. 57 [Ruggiep. 570][viii]). In transitional Democracies the development of these regimes are also transitional and thus often ineffective in establishing cooperation, thereby resulting in discord.
Norms must be Endogenous
It is useful to mention here two of Kehoanes four components of the international regime; Principles and Norms. While during the transitional period democratic principles defined as the purposes that their members are expected to pursue(Keohane p.58) [ix]of a democracy can be established exogenously and may be clear and understood, democratic norms as standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations (Keohane, 57)[x] are unclear and often unaccepted by the transitional democracy. Later this paper will use Krasners notion of Lags to support how institutional norms play a role in the democratic transitional period but first it is important to make this point using constructivism.
The instability of transitional democracies is a cause of the underdeveloped and often confused institutions and structure of the state. Before democratic institutions can function successfully the ideals of democracy must be accepted and reflected endogenously; in the process and social interactions of that state. An institution is a relatively stable set or structure ofoften codified in formal rules and norms but these have motivational force only in the virtue of actors, socialization to and participation in collective knowledge (Wendt, 399)[xi]. Endogenous support for these institutions must exist to develop acceptance of democratic norms before these institutions become effective; Wendt maintains that is process not structure that create norms this is due to process not structure(Wendt, 294)[xii]. Standards of behavior and obligation must be produced within the system. Institutional norms cannot be established exogenously.
This explains why top down approach to democratic state building and polities that made the biggest change from complete autocracy to democracy present the greatest risk ([Mansfield and Snyder] in Oneal p.270[xiii]) meet more resistance resulting in more unstable and violent transitional democracies.
Security Systems dilemma
In order for dyad democratic relationships to be peaceful, democracies must identify positively with one another and acquire a collective security interest, this collective security system is based on shared and communal interest (Wendt. 400-401[xiv]). Autocratic or non democratic security systems often identify with a self help security system in regards to democratic states.
In Democratic Peace, democracies must have a cooperative security system and cannot have competitive or individualistic security systems. Acknowledgment of the theory of Democratic peace demands recognition that all democracies have cooperative security systems. Instability during transitional democracies could be explained through the transition of security systems, from a competitive or individualistic system where states identify negatively or indifferently to the others security, to the cooperative system of dyad democracies where states identify positively and cooperate in establishing security (Wendt p.400)[xv].
Transitional democracies must override an institutionalized competitive or individualistic security system before accepting a cooperative system. This requires social reconfiguration and intersubjective change (Wendt p.406-07[xvi]) which is seen here as a dialectical process formulating collective meaning only over time. Social organizations themselves are reproduced only in and through the orientations and practices of members engaged in social interactions over time(Wendt, [Culter] p.406[xvii]). This period of social reconfiguration parallels the democratic transition.
Lags
Exogenous attempts to establish behavioral norms create incongruencies during transitional democratic periods. This can be explained through the concept of lags. Krasner identifies three causes of lags; custom and usage, uncertainty and cognitive failing (Krasner, 501-502)[xviii]. During democratic transitions, custom and usage can be used to identify the presence of lags in the socialization of democratic norms while uncertainty or distrust helps to understand the presence of lags in regime security system transitions.
Lags and Norms
Custom and usage often cause a continuance of support for a well established regime well after it is gone; lags may arise from customs and usage (Krasner, 502)[xix]. Individuals often continue to adhere to certain regimes simply because they have done so in the past. In an international regime, altering the norms of behavior requires the reformatting of custom and usage. Since during democratic transitions, democratic norms often lack endogenous recognition, these norms are likely to reflect or revert to those of the previous system and not that of the newly developing democracy.
Lags and Security Systems
Lags also occur through uncertainty (Krasner. 502)[xx]. When environmental change occurs, actors often develop a lack of confidence in new regimes. Often they find themselves reverting to the principles of a previous regime because of this uncertainly regarding a newly established regime; actors may continue to accept an established regime because they are uncertain about the durability of environmental change (Krasner, [Stein] p.502)[xxi]. This would especially hold true in matters pertaining to security. Shifting from a competitive or individualistic security system to a cooperative system or from a self help security system to a collective relationship, requires that the actors are confident in the new security arrangement or that actors must be convinced that a new arrangement is both right and feasible (Krasner, 502)[xxii]. Lags occur when this confidence does not exist.
This can also be explained in terms of separate peace (Herman and Kegley. 516)[xxiii] and by utilizing the outgroup and ingroup ideology. Leaders of democratic peace and people in democratic political systems view other democracies as being like them part of their own group and political identity Political systems that are not democratic are viewed more suspiciously (Hermann and Kegley. P.-516-17)[xxiv] A transitional democratic leaders perspective of other states, both autocratic and democratic, is important in understanding state interactions during periods of transitional democracy. People are more acceptant to those who are familiar and similar and distance from those who are dissimilar (Hermann and Kegley, 516).[xxv]
Transitional democracies may not be perceived or perceive others as part of an out-group or in-group, but perhaps somewhere in between. In order to recognize an ingroup relationship there must be an endogenous socialization of Democratic norms. The recognition of democratic principles alone is not sufficient to create an ingroup mentality. Thus individual leadership during transitional democratic phases may not identify collectively with that of fully fledged democracies.
Weak Institutions empower individual leadership
The apparent illegitimacy and weakness in regime functions during democratic transitional periods create a necessity to understand unstable democratic transitions through an individual level of analysis. The existence of weak or illegitimate regimes empowers individual leadership. Even in full fledged democracies, during times of crisis, leaders and leadership become highly concentrated and centralized (Hermann and Kegley, 515-516)[xxvi]. Herman and Kegly use war to illustrate this point. The same argument can be made for democratic transitional periods
During war, the institutional and normative restraints usually operating in a democracy diminish. This increases individual leadership decision making power (Hermann and Kegly. 315)[xxvii]. Like in war, democratic transitions are often marked by crisis, thus being subject to similar lack of normative and institutional restraint. Under conditions of crisis, the differences between autocracies and democracies narrow (Hermann and Kegley, 516[xxviii]).
It is reasonable to expect institutions to impose constraints on a leaders capacity to initiate war institutions impose hurdles (Hermann and Kegly. 315)[xxix]. Where the effectiveness of institutions is limited by the transitional period, institutional restraints are limited and even transitional democratic leaders are more easily able to operate without restraint. While the ultimate outcome of this scenario would depend on the leaders perceptions and leadership styles, even leaders that accept democratic norms will hold high concentrations of authority. Thus, in transitional democracies, psychological outlook and individual levels of analysis become influential in understanding instable democratic transitions.
Transitional Democratic leadership is Ideological
Leadership can be divided into responsive leadership and ideological leadership. (Hermann and Kegley, 521-22)[xxx]. The former type rests on the setting, environment or nature of the state structure, while ideological leadership rests on a set of ideas, a cause, problem to be solved or an ideology (Herman and Kegley, 521-22)[xxxi] While democracies are more prone but not limited to having responsive leaders, more subject to restraints and public opinion (Herman and Kegley, 525), states in transitional democratic periods actively pursue an ideology of democracy and take on a more conflict prone ideological leadership. Ideological driven leaders are more likely to escalate towards war (Hermann and Kegley, 528)[xxxii]. Lack of institutional restraint and difference between perception and reality both contribute to the degrees of ideological leadership.
The lack of institutional restraint in transitional democracies yields stronger and often more extreme and ideological leadership. These leaders must overcome constraints to protect and strengthen newly established democratic institutions, overcome lags and establish socialization of endogenous democratic norms. The absence of consolidated democratic institutions during transitional phases of democracy allows leaders to pull policy making in their direction more effectively. Democratic leaders often feel justified in their covert behavior because they perceive the targets of being wavering in their commitment to democracy (Herman and Kegley, 526[xxxiii]). This lack of restraint creates little political competition and few restrictions on a leaders authority. When opposition or restraints are likely to occur or exist these leaders take on pragmatic or radical orientation towards responding to threats. (Herman and Kegley. 527)[xxxiv].
When differences between perceptions and reality exist decision making becomes crucial in the understanding of individual leadership styles it is useful to examine decision making if there are constant differences between the decision makers perceptions and reality(Jervis, 29[xxxv]); the greater the contrast between ideology and reality the greater the likelihood of extremity in leadership orientation. This contrast can be identified by the amount of resistance present in a transitional democracy. Resistance in a transitional democracy is measured by the effectiveness or maturity of its institutions, degree of endogenous socialization of norms and the severity of lags in norms and security systems.
While Democratic transitions begin with the perception and the recognition of democratic principles. Establishing a Democratic reality is a process. Understanding the limited functions of newly established democratic institutions, the importance of endogenous socialization and security outlooks and the causes of incongruence or lags during transitional periods help to identify the sources of these transitional democratic instabilities. Examining leadership roles helps to explain how ideological leadership emerges as a response to strengthening these limitations and consolidating democracy.
Perhaps the nearest concept to imperial law in international politics is the Theory of Democratic Peace. This theory states that dyad democratic relationships are relatively unlikely to engage in militarized confrontation (Oneal and Russett, 267)[i]. However, transitional democracies are known to be more violent, unstable and conflict prone. Democratic Peace is limited to relationships among mature democracies the process of democratization makes fledging democracies more prone to conflict (Oneal, Russett 270; [Mansfield and Snyder])[ii]. Premature institutions, lack of endogenous socialization of democratic norms, transitions in security systems and the presence of lags help explain the existence of instabilities during transitional democratic periods. Ultimately premature institutions yield power to ideological individual leadership which often acquires a radical orientation in attempt to pursue realization of a democratic reality.
Regimes facilitate Cooperation from discord
One role of institutions is its purpose in converting discord into cooperation where harmony does not exist (Keohane, 51-52[iii]).Accordingly; Democratic Peace requires the facilitation of regimes to establish cooperation necessary to create democratic peace. The institutions and regimes of transitional democracies often fail in facilitating cooperation, thus lending to the instability of transitional democracies.
Keohane explains international conflict as arising from interdependence, resulting from democratic states expansion abroad as a means of protecting their own domestic economic and security interests. Interdependence leads democratic governments to expand state activity in order to protect their own citizens (Keohane, P.5,6)[iv]. Autocratic or non democratic governments are often pressured exogenously to acquire democratic reforms. This is often referred to top down state building. When this process is established exogenously, it often results in discord. This discord manifests itself in the transitional democratic period.
In a non hegemonic system, states that share mutual interests and shared perceptions make cooperation possible through the facilitation of international regimes (Keohane, 56-57)[v]. Neo liberal Institutionalism would cite the absence of or lack in regime integration or coordination in transitional democracies to explain their conflict prone tendencies. Neoliberal Institutionalists agree that Democratic Peace is established through cooperation and shared interests but also through the incorporation of these factors into laws and institutions non hegemonic cooperation is possible, and that it is facilitated through international regimes (Keohane p.50)[vi]. While transitional democracies may identify common principles with other democracies, the institutions of a transitional democracy while still young and undeveloped are incapable of facilitating cooperation. The mere existence of common interests is not enough [for cooperation]: institutions that reduce uncertainty and limit asymmetries in information must also exist. (Keohane 12-13[vii]).
A Neoliberal Institutionalist systems level of analysis would define a regime as a set of mutual expectations, rules and regulations, plans, organizational energies and financial commitments which have been accepted by a group of states. (Keohane. P. 57 [Ruggiep. 570][viii]). In transitional Democracies the development of these regimes are also transitional and thus often ineffective in establishing cooperation, thereby resulting in discord.
Norms must be Endogenous
It is useful to mention here two of Kehoanes four components of the international regime; Principles and Norms. While during the transitional period democratic principles defined as the purposes that their members are expected to pursue(Keohane p.58) [ix]of a democracy can be established exogenously and may be clear and understood, democratic norms as standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations (Keohane, 57)[x] are unclear and often unaccepted by the transitional democracy. Later this paper will use Krasners notion of Lags to support how institutional norms play a role in the democratic transitional period but first it is important to make this point using constructivism.
The instability of transitional democracies is a cause of the underdeveloped and often confused institutions and structure of the state. Before democratic institutions can function successfully the ideals of democracy must be accepted and reflected endogenously; in the process and social interactions of that state. An institution is a relatively stable set or structure ofoften codified in formal rules and norms but these have motivational force only in the virtue of actors, socialization to and participation in collective knowledge (Wendt, 399)[xi]. Endogenous support for these institutions must exist to develop acceptance of democratic norms before these institutions become effective; Wendt maintains that is process not structure that create norms this is due to process not structure(Wendt, 294)[xii]. Standards of behavior and obligation must be produced within the system. Institutional norms cannot be established exogenously.
This explains why top down approach to democratic state building and polities that made the biggest change from complete autocracy to democracy present the greatest risk ([Mansfield and Snyder] in Oneal p.270[xiii]) meet more resistance resulting in more unstable and violent transitional democracies.
Security Systems dilemma
In order for dyad democratic relationships to be peaceful, democracies must identify positively with one another and acquire a collective security interest, this collective security system is based on shared and communal interest (Wendt. 400-401[xiv]). Autocratic or non democratic security systems often identify with a self help security system in regards to democratic states.
In Democratic Peace, democracies must have a cooperative security system and cannot have competitive or individualistic security systems. Acknowledgment of the theory of Democratic peace demands recognition that all democracies have cooperative security systems. Instability during transitional democracies could be explained through the transition of security systems, from a competitive or individualistic system where states identify negatively or indifferently to the others security, to the cooperative system of dyad democracies where states identify positively and cooperate in establishing security (Wendt p.400)[xv].
Transitional democracies must override an institutionalized competitive or individualistic security system before accepting a cooperative system. This requires social reconfiguration and intersubjective change (Wendt p.406-07[xvi]) which is seen here as a dialectical process formulating collective meaning only over time. Social organizations themselves are reproduced only in and through the orientations and practices of members engaged in social interactions over time(Wendt, [Culter] p.406[xvii]). This period of social reconfiguration parallels the democratic transition.
Lags
Exogenous attempts to establish behavioral norms create incongruencies during transitional democratic periods. This can be explained through the concept of lags. Krasner identifies three causes of lags; custom and usage, uncertainty and cognitive failing (Krasner, 501-502)[xviii]. During democratic transitions, custom and usage can be used to identify the presence of lags in the socialization of democratic norms while uncertainty or distrust helps to understand the presence of lags in regime security system transitions.
Lags and Norms
Custom and usage often cause a continuance of support for a well established regime well after it is gone; lags may arise from customs and usage (Krasner, 502)[xix]. Individuals often continue to adhere to certain regimes simply because they have done so in the past. In an international regime, altering the norms of behavior requires the reformatting of custom and usage. Since during democratic transitions, democratic norms often lack endogenous recognition, these norms are likely to reflect or revert to those of the previous system and not that of the newly developing democracy.
Lags and Security Systems
Lags also occur through uncertainty (Krasner. 502)[xx]. When environmental change occurs, actors often develop a lack of confidence in new regimes. Often they find themselves reverting to the principles of a previous regime because of this uncertainly regarding a newly established regime; actors may continue to accept an established regime because they are uncertain about the durability of environmental change (Krasner, [Stein] p.502)[xxi]. This would especially hold true in matters pertaining to security. Shifting from a competitive or individualistic security system to a cooperative system or from a self help security system to a collective relationship, requires that the actors are confident in the new security arrangement or that actors must be convinced that a new arrangement is both right and feasible (Krasner, 502)[xxii]. Lags occur when this confidence does not exist.
This can also be explained in terms of separate peace (Herman and Kegley. 516)[xxiii] and by utilizing the outgroup and ingroup ideology. Leaders of democratic peace and people in democratic political systems view other democracies as being like them part of their own group and political identity Political systems that are not democratic are viewed more suspiciously (Hermann and Kegley. P.-516-17)[xxiv] A transitional democratic leaders perspective of other states, both autocratic and democratic, is important in understanding state interactions during periods of transitional democracy. People are more acceptant to those who are familiar and similar and distance from those who are dissimilar (Hermann and Kegley, 516).[xxv]
Transitional democracies may not be perceived or perceive others as part of an out-group or in-group, but perhaps somewhere in between. In order to recognize an ingroup relationship there must be an endogenous socialization of Democratic norms. The recognition of democratic principles alone is not sufficient to create an ingroup mentality. Thus individual leadership during transitional democratic phases may not identify collectively with that of fully fledged democracies.
Weak Institutions empower individual leadership
The apparent illegitimacy and weakness in regime functions during democratic transitional periods create a necessity to understand unstable democratic transitions through an individual level of analysis. The existence of weak or illegitimate regimes empowers individual leadership. Even in full fledged democracies, during times of crisis, leaders and leadership become highly concentrated and centralized (Hermann and Kegley, 515-516)[xxvi]. Herman and Kegly use war to illustrate this point. The same argument can be made for democratic transitional periods
During war, the institutional and normative restraints usually operating in a democracy diminish. This increases individual leadership decision making power (Hermann and Kegly. 315)[xxvii]. Like in war, democratic transitions are often marked by crisis, thus being subject to similar lack of normative and institutional restraint. Under conditions of crisis, the differences between autocracies and democracies narrow (Hermann and Kegley, 516[xxviii]).
It is reasonable to expect institutions to impose constraints on a leaders capacity to initiate war institutions impose hurdles (Hermann and Kegly. 315)[xxix]. Where the effectiveness of institutions is limited by the transitional period, institutional restraints are limited and even transitional democratic leaders are more easily able to operate without restraint. While the ultimate outcome of this scenario would depend on the leaders perceptions and leadership styles, even leaders that accept democratic norms will hold high concentrations of authority. Thus, in transitional democracies, psychological outlook and individual levels of analysis become influential in understanding instable democratic transitions.
Transitional Democratic leadership is Ideological
Leadership can be divided into responsive leadership and ideological leadership. (Hermann and Kegley, 521-22)[xxx]. The former type rests on the setting, environment or nature of the state structure, while ideological leadership rests on a set of ideas, a cause, problem to be solved or an ideology (Herman and Kegley, 521-22)[xxxi] While democracies are more prone but not limited to having responsive leaders, more subject to restraints and public opinion (Herman and Kegley, 525), states in transitional democratic periods actively pursue an ideology of democracy and take on a more conflict prone ideological leadership. Ideological driven leaders are more likely to escalate towards war (Hermann and Kegley, 528)[xxxii]. Lack of institutional restraint and difference between perception and reality both contribute to the degrees of ideological leadership.
The lack of institutional restraint in transitional democracies yields stronger and often more extreme and ideological leadership. These leaders must overcome constraints to protect and strengthen newly established democratic institutions, overcome lags and establish socialization of endogenous democratic norms. The absence of consolidated democratic institutions during transitional phases of democracy allows leaders to pull policy making in their direction more effectively. Democratic leaders often feel justified in their covert behavior because they perceive the targets of being wavering in their commitment to democracy (Herman and Kegley, 526[xxxiii]). This lack of restraint creates little political competition and few restrictions on a leaders authority. When opposition or restraints are likely to occur or exist these leaders take on pragmatic or radical orientation towards responding to threats. (Herman and Kegley. 527)[xxxiv].
When differences between perceptions and reality exist decision making becomes crucial in the understanding of individual leadership styles it is useful to examine decision making if there are constant differences between the decision makers perceptions and reality(Jervis, 29[xxxv]); the greater the contrast between ideology and reality the greater the likelihood of extremity in leadership orientation. This contrast can be identified by the amount of resistance present in a transitional democracy. Resistance in a transitional democracy is measured by the effectiveness or maturity of its institutions, degree of endogenous socialization of norms and the severity of lags in norms and security systems.
While Democratic transitions begin with the perception and the recognition of democratic principles. Establishing a Democratic reality is a process. Understanding the limited functions of newly established democratic institutions, the importance of endogenous socialization and security outlooks and the causes of incongruence or lags during transitional periods help to identify the sources of these transitional democratic instabilities. Examining leadership roles helps to explain how ideological leadership emerges as a response to strengthening these limitations and consolidating democracy.
Neoliberal-Institutionalism versus the Realist
This argument will explain that interdependencies have made cooperation the primary means of acquiring power in an interdependent, non hegemonic system. In explaining state behavior defined in pursuit of self interest and power, Realism is a deductive theory largely driven by the same core assumptions as Neoliberal Institutionalism. While both Neoliberal Institutionalists and Realists explain that states are rational actors, Realism fails to explain and perceive the growth of cooperation and regime formation in a non hegemonic system. Although Neoliberal Institutionalism assumes the existence of shared interests, it demonstrates that states benefit from regime cooperation in two principle ways; by limiting uncertainty and increasing decision making capabilities. These factors help transform anarchy and yield maximum power in an interdependent non hegemonic system. Regimes establish a structure in which its restrictive nature promotes cooperation and provides security in the international system. This makes Neoliberal Institutionalism the most effective theory of international relations.
Both Neoliberal Institutionalism and Realism examine the behavior of states to establish theory of foreign policy and international relations. A State level of analysis does not look within states but rather examines the interactions between states. While Realists attempt to explain state behavior through power1, Neoliberal Institutionalism explains state behavior in terms of cooperation through interests and power and attempts to explain how regimes interact with state behavior2.
In addition to explaining international relations by examining state behavior, Neoliberal Institutionalist theory shares many of the same assumptions as realism. In fact, Keohane demonstrates that regime cooperation is possible based on the same set of assumptions that realists use to define state behavior in terms of power. Both Neoliberal Institutionalism and Realism establish rationality as the link between system structure and state behavior in an anarchic environment. Rationality is defined by a process in which responses are based on maximizing benefits and minimizing risks. Acting in accordance with benefits and risks allows for the best interest to be achieved3.
Neoliberal Institutionalism maintains that best interest can be achieved through cooperation and regimes4. Furthermore, although Neoliberal Institutionalism assumes the existence of shared interests, it does not assume that shared interests are always realized. Thus regimes create cooperation where “harmony” or natural cooperation does not exist and regimes help facilitate and establish cooperation where “discord” exists5.
Regime Cooperation Limits Anarchy
Realism suggests that morality does not always have a role in what defines the “best” political course of action. “Universal moral principals cannot be applied to the actions of states”6. Above all, a states purpose is survival and states must often sacrifice morality to maintain survival7. While this makes prudence a crucial characteristic of Realism, it leads to the uncertainty of the behavior of states. This uncertainty is defined as anarchy.
The existence of regimes limits uncertainty between state interactions. Regimes can weave moral principal and moral aspirations of states into “rules of thumb”. These “rules of thumb” can be incorporated into universal decision making processes and norms 8. By adhering to these norms, universally acknowledged principals of behavior are established. “Regime rules and principals are often treated as having moral universal value”9. This creates a recognized standard of moral restraint which limits uncertainty among state interactions.” Establish of norms and procedures limit uncertainty”10.
Realists “maintain the autonomy of the political sphere”11 with regard to decision making. Realism recognizes different facets of interest allocating them into separate spheres. In an interdependent or non hegemonic system interests are often interconnected and these facets overlap. In reality the political sphere is larger and more encompassing then realism defines it. Growing interdependencies correlate with a widening of the political sphere.
Regimes create coordination between these facets and allow states to cooperate within a widened sphere of political interest “In a world of sovereign states, the basic function of regimes is to coordinate state behavior to achieve desired outcomes in issue areas”12. This maximizes the potential and options available to the decision maker and creates a legitimate, issue coordinated venue for state interaction. The existence of this legitimate platform where states can interact not only improves state interaction but reduces transaction costs. “The nesting patters of international regimes affect transaction costs by making it easier to link particular issues”13.
Establishing widely accepted norms or behavior and coordinating among diverse issue areas to maximize decision making helps provide structure in an anarchic environment. The notion that this structure or restrictive nature of regimes yield to beneficial outcomes corresponds to Kranser’s third category of regime significance and the “modified structural” position regarding the benefits a regimes restrictive nature has on an anarchic world14.
Regime Cooperation Yields Maximum Power
A states ultimate objective is survival. States will unilaterally pursue their interests in terms of power often with disregard for moral standards. Morgenthau would explain that morality is a different “sphere” than politics “the political realist maintains the autonomy of the political sphere, as the economist, the lawyer, the moralist maintain theirs”15. However, this makes states untrustworthy and contributes to a world of anarchy. States however, which have a common interest in regime cooperation limit anarchy by adhering to norms and principles of regimes.
Realism incorporates the notion that states are responsible for their own security. Realists define power as “mans control over influence of other men”; this influence is defined by the “existence of expectations of benefits and the fear of disadvantage”.16 By cooperating and adhering to regimes security interest often become a mutual interest between states. This is because in regimes, often a threat to one states security is a threat to the interest or security of another. States will avoid taking action against another state if it has a negative outcome to their own self interest.
This concept can be supported by the notion of Democratic Peace which has been called “the closest concept to imperial law” in regards to International Relations17. In Democratic Peace theory, norms and institutions of democracy and economic interdependence allow states to share same benefits and disadvantages18.This interdependence limits anarchy by creating norms of behavior where the rational actor would be at a detriment in imposing on the security of another state. The existence of this detriment increases one states influence over the other in terms of security interests. This control and influence is power.
Realists explain legitimate power as power that is morally and legally justified19. Morgenthau maintains that legitimate power is more effective than illegitimate power20. Without regimes, the use of force will often become subjective and be perceived as illegitimate. Adherence to regimes objectifies the use of force and increases the likelihood of the legitimate use of force. Thus regimes increase the effectiveness and efficiency of the use of force.
Perceptions of Objective Reality support Neoliberal Institutionalism
Since Neoliberal Institutionalism and Realism both identify with the same assumptions regarding state behavior, support for Neoliberal Institutionalism can be better understood by examining the role of perceptions in international politics. Here, it is important to understand the role perceptions have on state behavior. Jervis supports the notion of an objective reality. Jervis’ two step model establishes that altered perceptions do influence policy or behavior and that identifying the sources of these different perceptions is necessary in understanding altered perceptions21.
Adhering to Jervis’ two step model is helpful in explaining the growth of Neoliberal Institutionalist theory. Neoliberal Institutionalism and Realism differ in perception of the international system. Realist interpretation of international system is a misconception perhaps derived and built upon the ideal types of history or from a previous outdated political system. In reality, the existence of interdependencies and transnational institutions support the notion that Neoliberal Institutionalist theory is closer to objective reality. Interdependencies and transnational actors have changed the structure of the international system. Perceptions that have changed and adapted to this newly defined structure support the notions of Neoliberal Institutionalism.
This correlates with the notion that anarchy is due to process and not structure and that “anarchy is what states make of it”22. Rules and norms of institutions are created endogenously through societal socialization. The socialization of rules and norms is what changes perceptions23. Realist’s perception of regimes as extensions of self help and failure to recognize importance of regimes in terms of cooperation is largely because of this lack of socialization.
Conclusion
In an anarchic world, regimes improve interactions between states. Other, critics of Neoliberal Institutionalists outside the Realist framework might include dependency theorists, whom would argue that regimes reinforce power inequalities by allowing strong to exploit the weak24 . Strange incorporates this notion into her fifth critique of regimes in maintaining that they are “narrow minded, limited in state centric paradigm that limits the vision of a wider reality”25. However, even in a non hegemony strong and weak states exist and so will power inequalities between them. In fact, regimes help provide balance by establishing norms of behavior, increasing decision making capabilities and minimizing interaction costs. These are especially helpful to weak actors whom have to interact with larger more powerful states.
In examining an anarchic international system, it is important to study the interactions of states. This makes Realism and Neoliberal Institutionalism the predominant theories of international relations. However, the existence of interdependencies in the international system has made cooperation the prominent interest of state behavior. Where Realism and other theories of international relations fail to acknowledge significance of regime cooperation, creating a misconception of objective reality; Neoliberal Institutionalism acknowledges that regimes facilitate cooperation. This makes Neoliberal Institutionalism the single most important theory of international relations. Regimes not only allow states to pursue and realize their interest in cooperation, but cooperation within regimes helps to control anarchy by limiting uncertainties and maximizing options available to the decision maker. In addition, the existence of mutual interest and mutual disadvantages help deter the illegitimate use of force. These benefits are derived from the restrictive nature of regimes. The consequences of anarchy are greater with interdependency, thus limiting anarchy is crucial in establishing stability in an evolving interdependent and non hegemonic international system.
1 “Politics Among Nations”, H.J Morgenthau, K.W. Thompsan; Miller Center for Public Affairs, 1985, pg.10
2 “After Hegemony; Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy” R. Keohane, Princeton University Press, NJ 1984, pg.8
3 “Politics Among Nations”, H.J Morgenthau, K.W. Thompsan; Miller Center for Public Affairs, 1985, pg.10
4 “After Hegemony; Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy” R. Keohane, Princeton University Press, NJ 1984, pg.11
5 “After Hegemony; Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy” R. Keohane, Princeton University Press, NJ 1984, pg.54
6 “Politics Among Nations”, H.J Morgenthau, K.W. Thompsan; Miller Center for Public Affairs, 1985, pg.12
7 “Politics Among Nations”, H.J Morgenthau, K.W. Thompsan; Miller Center for Public Affairs, 1985, pg.12
8 “After Hegemony; Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy” R. Keohane, Princeton University Press, NJ 1984, pg.14
9 “After Hegemony; Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy” R. Keohane, Princeton University Press, NJ 1984, pg.14
10 “After Hegemony; Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy” R. Keohane, Princeton University Press, NJ 1984, pg.11
11 “Politics Among Nations”, H.J Morgenthau, K.W. Thompsan; Miller Center for Public Affairs, 1985, pg.13
12 “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences; Regimes as Intervening Variables”, Stephen D. Krasner (Agerwal), Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1982 pg.191
13 “After Hegemony; Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy” R. Keohane, Princeton University Press, NJ 1984, pg.91
14 “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences; Regimes as Intervening Variables”, Stephen D. Krasner (Agerwal), Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1982 pg.185
15 “Politics Among Nations”, H.J Morgenthau, K.W. Thompsan; Miller Center for Public Affairs, 1985, pg.13
16 “Politics Among Nations”, H.J Morgenthau, K.W. Thompsan; Miller Center for Public Affairs, 1985, pg.32-33
17 “The Classical Liberals Were Right: Democracy, Interdependence, and Conflict, 1950-1985”; John R. Oneal & Bruce M. Russett. International Studies Association, Blackwell Publishers, 1997
18 “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics; logic of two level games”, Putnam, World Peace Foundation, 1988, pg. 459-460
19 “Politics Among Nations”, H.J Morgenthau, K.W. Thompsan; Miller Center for Public Affairs, 1985, pg.34
20 “Politics Among Nations”, H.J Morgenthau, K.W. Thompsan; Miller Center for Public Affairs, 1985, pg.34
21 “Perception and Misperception in International Politics”, Jervis, Princeton University Press, 1976, pg.14
22 “Anarchy is what States Make of It; The Social Construction of Power Politics; Wendt, World Peace Foundation, 1992, pg. 394-395
23 “Anarchy is what States Make of It; The Social Construction of Power Politics; Wendt, World Peace Foundation, 1992, pg. 394-395
24 “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences; Regimes as Intervening Variables”, Stephen D. Krasner, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1982 pg.504
25 “Cave! Hic Dragones” A Critique of Regime Analysis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1982. pg.509
Both Neoliberal Institutionalism and Realism examine the behavior of states to establish theory of foreign policy and international relations. A State level of analysis does not look within states but rather examines the interactions between states. While Realists attempt to explain state behavior through power1, Neoliberal Institutionalism explains state behavior in terms of cooperation through interests and power and attempts to explain how regimes interact with state behavior2.
In addition to explaining international relations by examining state behavior, Neoliberal Institutionalist theory shares many of the same assumptions as realism. In fact, Keohane demonstrates that regime cooperation is possible based on the same set of assumptions that realists use to define state behavior in terms of power. Both Neoliberal Institutionalism and Realism establish rationality as the link between system structure and state behavior in an anarchic environment. Rationality is defined by a process in which responses are based on maximizing benefits and minimizing risks. Acting in accordance with benefits and risks allows for the best interest to be achieved3.
Neoliberal Institutionalism maintains that best interest can be achieved through cooperation and regimes4. Furthermore, although Neoliberal Institutionalism assumes the existence of shared interests, it does not assume that shared interests are always realized. Thus regimes create cooperation where “harmony” or natural cooperation does not exist and regimes help facilitate and establish cooperation where “discord” exists5.
Regime Cooperation Limits Anarchy
Realism suggests that morality does not always have a role in what defines the “best” political course of action. “Universal moral principals cannot be applied to the actions of states”6. Above all, a states purpose is survival and states must often sacrifice morality to maintain survival7. While this makes prudence a crucial characteristic of Realism, it leads to the uncertainty of the behavior of states. This uncertainty is defined as anarchy.
The existence of regimes limits uncertainty between state interactions. Regimes can weave moral principal and moral aspirations of states into “rules of thumb”. These “rules of thumb” can be incorporated into universal decision making processes and norms 8. By adhering to these norms, universally acknowledged principals of behavior are established. “Regime rules and principals are often treated as having moral universal value”9. This creates a recognized standard of moral restraint which limits uncertainty among state interactions.” Establish of norms and procedures limit uncertainty”10.
Realists “maintain the autonomy of the political sphere”11 with regard to decision making. Realism recognizes different facets of interest allocating them into separate spheres. In an interdependent or non hegemonic system interests are often interconnected and these facets overlap. In reality the political sphere is larger and more encompassing then realism defines it. Growing interdependencies correlate with a widening of the political sphere.
Regimes create coordination between these facets and allow states to cooperate within a widened sphere of political interest “In a world of sovereign states, the basic function of regimes is to coordinate state behavior to achieve desired outcomes in issue areas”12. This maximizes the potential and options available to the decision maker and creates a legitimate, issue coordinated venue for state interaction. The existence of this legitimate platform where states can interact not only improves state interaction but reduces transaction costs. “The nesting patters of international regimes affect transaction costs by making it easier to link particular issues”13.
Establishing widely accepted norms or behavior and coordinating among diverse issue areas to maximize decision making helps provide structure in an anarchic environment. The notion that this structure or restrictive nature of regimes yield to beneficial outcomes corresponds to Kranser’s third category of regime significance and the “modified structural” position regarding the benefits a regimes restrictive nature has on an anarchic world14.
Regime Cooperation Yields Maximum Power
A states ultimate objective is survival. States will unilaterally pursue their interests in terms of power often with disregard for moral standards. Morgenthau would explain that morality is a different “sphere” than politics “the political realist maintains the autonomy of the political sphere, as the economist, the lawyer, the moralist maintain theirs”15. However, this makes states untrustworthy and contributes to a world of anarchy. States however, which have a common interest in regime cooperation limit anarchy by adhering to norms and principles of regimes.
Realism incorporates the notion that states are responsible for their own security. Realists define power as “mans control over influence of other men”; this influence is defined by the “existence of expectations of benefits and the fear of disadvantage”.16 By cooperating and adhering to regimes security interest often become a mutual interest between states. This is because in regimes, often a threat to one states security is a threat to the interest or security of another. States will avoid taking action against another state if it has a negative outcome to their own self interest.
This concept can be supported by the notion of Democratic Peace which has been called “the closest concept to imperial law” in regards to International Relations17. In Democratic Peace theory, norms and institutions of democracy and economic interdependence allow states to share same benefits and disadvantages18.This interdependence limits anarchy by creating norms of behavior where the rational actor would be at a detriment in imposing on the security of another state. The existence of this detriment increases one states influence over the other in terms of security interests. This control and influence is power.
Realists explain legitimate power as power that is morally and legally justified19. Morgenthau maintains that legitimate power is more effective than illegitimate power20. Without regimes, the use of force will often become subjective and be perceived as illegitimate. Adherence to regimes objectifies the use of force and increases the likelihood of the legitimate use of force. Thus regimes increase the effectiveness and efficiency of the use of force.
Perceptions of Objective Reality support Neoliberal Institutionalism
Since Neoliberal Institutionalism and Realism both identify with the same assumptions regarding state behavior, support for Neoliberal Institutionalism can be better understood by examining the role of perceptions in international politics. Here, it is important to understand the role perceptions have on state behavior. Jervis supports the notion of an objective reality. Jervis’ two step model establishes that altered perceptions do influence policy or behavior and that identifying the sources of these different perceptions is necessary in understanding altered perceptions21.
Adhering to Jervis’ two step model is helpful in explaining the growth of Neoliberal Institutionalist theory. Neoliberal Institutionalism and Realism differ in perception of the international system. Realist interpretation of international system is a misconception perhaps derived and built upon the ideal types of history or from a previous outdated political system. In reality, the existence of interdependencies and transnational institutions support the notion that Neoliberal Institutionalist theory is closer to objective reality. Interdependencies and transnational actors have changed the structure of the international system. Perceptions that have changed and adapted to this newly defined structure support the notions of Neoliberal Institutionalism.
This correlates with the notion that anarchy is due to process and not structure and that “anarchy is what states make of it”22. Rules and norms of institutions are created endogenously through societal socialization. The socialization of rules and norms is what changes perceptions23. Realist’s perception of regimes as extensions of self help and failure to recognize importance of regimes in terms of cooperation is largely because of this lack of socialization.
Conclusion
In an anarchic world, regimes improve interactions between states. Other, critics of Neoliberal Institutionalists outside the Realist framework might include dependency theorists, whom would argue that regimes reinforce power inequalities by allowing strong to exploit the weak24 . Strange incorporates this notion into her fifth critique of regimes in maintaining that they are “narrow minded, limited in state centric paradigm that limits the vision of a wider reality”25. However, even in a non hegemony strong and weak states exist and so will power inequalities between them. In fact, regimes help provide balance by establishing norms of behavior, increasing decision making capabilities and minimizing interaction costs. These are especially helpful to weak actors whom have to interact with larger more powerful states.
In examining an anarchic international system, it is important to study the interactions of states. This makes Realism and Neoliberal Institutionalism the predominant theories of international relations. However, the existence of interdependencies in the international system has made cooperation the prominent interest of state behavior. Where Realism and other theories of international relations fail to acknowledge significance of regime cooperation, creating a misconception of objective reality; Neoliberal Institutionalism acknowledges that regimes facilitate cooperation. This makes Neoliberal Institutionalism the single most important theory of international relations. Regimes not only allow states to pursue and realize their interest in cooperation, but cooperation within regimes helps to control anarchy by limiting uncertainties and maximizing options available to the decision maker. In addition, the existence of mutual interest and mutual disadvantages help deter the illegitimate use of force. These benefits are derived from the restrictive nature of regimes. The consequences of anarchy are greater with interdependency, thus limiting anarchy is crucial in establishing stability in an evolving interdependent and non hegemonic international system.
1 “Politics Among Nations”, H.J Morgenthau, K.W. Thompsan; Miller Center for Public Affairs, 1985, pg.10
2 “After Hegemony; Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy” R. Keohane, Princeton University Press, NJ 1984, pg.8
3 “Politics Among Nations”, H.J Morgenthau, K.W. Thompsan; Miller Center for Public Affairs, 1985, pg.10
4 “After Hegemony; Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy” R. Keohane, Princeton University Press, NJ 1984, pg.11
5 “After Hegemony; Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy” R. Keohane, Princeton University Press, NJ 1984, pg.54
6 “Politics Among Nations”, H.J Morgenthau, K.W. Thompsan; Miller Center for Public Affairs, 1985, pg.12
7 “Politics Among Nations”, H.J Morgenthau, K.W. Thompsan; Miller Center for Public Affairs, 1985, pg.12
8 “After Hegemony; Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy” R. Keohane, Princeton University Press, NJ 1984, pg.14
9 “After Hegemony; Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy” R. Keohane, Princeton University Press, NJ 1984, pg.14
10 “After Hegemony; Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy” R. Keohane, Princeton University Press, NJ 1984, pg.11
11 “Politics Among Nations”, H.J Morgenthau, K.W. Thompsan; Miller Center for Public Affairs, 1985, pg.13
12 “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences; Regimes as Intervening Variables”, Stephen D. Krasner (Agerwal), Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1982 pg.191
13 “After Hegemony; Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy” R. Keohane, Princeton University Press, NJ 1984, pg.91
14 “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences; Regimes as Intervening Variables”, Stephen D. Krasner (Agerwal), Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1982 pg.185
15 “Politics Among Nations”, H.J Morgenthau, K.W. Thompsan; Miller Center for Public Affairs, 1985, pg.13
16 “Politics Among Nations”, H.J Morgenthau, K.W. Thompsan; Miller Center for Public Affairs, 1985, pg.32-33
17 “The Classical Liberals Were Right: Democracy, Interdependence, and Conflict, 1950-1985”; John R. Oneal & Bruce M. Russett. International Studies Association, Blackwell Publishers, 1997
18 “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics; logic of two level games”, Putnam, World Peace Foundation, 1988, pg. 459-460
19 “Politics Among Nations”, H.J Morgenthau, K.W. Thompsan; Miller Center for Public Affairs, 1985, pg.34
20 “Politics Among Nations”, H.J Morgenthau, K.W. Thompsan; Miller Center for Public Affairs, 1985, pg.34
21 “Perception and Misperception in International Politics”, Jervis, Princeton University Press, 1976, pg.14
22 “Anarchy is what States Make of It; The Social Construction of Power Politics; Wendt, World Peace Foundation, 1992, pg. 394-395
23 “Anarchy is what States Make of It; The Social Construction of Power Politics; Wendt, World Peace Foundation, 1992, pg. 394-395
24 “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences; Regimes as Intervening Variables”, Stephen D. Krasner, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1982 pg.504
25 “Cave! Hic Dragones” A Critique of Regime Analysis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1982. pg.509
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