Neoliberal-Institutionalism versus the Realist

This argument will explain that interdependencies have made cooperation the primary means of acquiring power in an interdependent, non hegemonic system. In explaining state behavior defined in pursuit of self interest and power, Realism is a deductive theory largely driven by the same core assumptions as Neoliberal Institutionalism. While both Neoliberal Institutionalists and Realists explain that states are rational actors, Realism fails to explain and perceive the growth of cooperation and regime formation in a non hegemonic system. Although Neoliberal Institutionalism assumes the existence of shared interests, it demonstrates that states benefit from regime cooperation in two principle ways; by limiting uncertainty and increasing decision making capabilities. These factors help transform anarchy and yield maximum power in an interdependent non hegemonic system. Regimes establish a structure in which its restrictive nature promotes cooperation and provides security in the international system. This makes Neoliberal Institutionalism the most effective theory of international relations.
Both Neoliberal Institutionalism and Realism examine the behavior of states to establish theory of foreign policy and international relations. A State level of analysis does not look within states but rather examines the interactions between states. While Realists attempt to explain state behavior through power1, Neoliberal Institutionalism explains state behavior in terms of cooperation through interests and power and attempts to explain how regimes interact with state behavior2.
In addition to explaining international relations by examining state behavior, Neoliberal Institutionalist theory shares many of the same assumptions as realism. In fact, Keohane demonstrates that regime cooperation is possible based on the same set of assumptions that realists use to define state behavior in terms of power. Both Neoliberal Institutionalism and Realism establish rationality as the link between system structure and state behavior in an anarchic environment. Rationality is defined by a process in which responses are based on maximizing benefits and minimizing risks. Acting in accordance with benefits and risks allows for the best interest to be achieved3.
Neoliberal Institutionalism maintains that best interest can be achieved through cooperation and regimes4. Furthermore, although Neoliberal Institutionalism assumes the existence of shared interests, it does not assume that shared interests are always realized. Thus regimes create cooperation where “harmony” or natural cooperation does not exist and regimes help facilitate and establish cooperation where “discord” exists5.
Regime Cooperation Limits Anarchy
Realism suggests that morality does not always have a role in what defines the “best” political course of action. “Universal moral principals cannot be applied to the actions of states”6. Above all, a states purpose is survival and states must often sacrifice morality to maintain survival7. While this makes prudence a crucial characteristic of Realism, it leads to the uncertainty of the behavior of states. This uncertainty is defined as anarchy.
The existence of regimes limits uncertainty between state interactions. Regimes can weave moral principal and moral aspirations of states into “rules of thumb”. These “rules of thumb” can be incorporated into universal decision making processes and norms 8. By adhering to these norms, universally acknowledged principals of behavior are established. “Regime rules and principals are often treated as having moral universal value”9. This creates a recognized standard of moral restraint which limits uncertainty among state interactions.” Establish of norms and procedures limit uncertainty”10.
Realists “maintain the autonomy of the political sphere”11 with regard to decision making. Realism recognizes different facets of interest allocating them into separate spheres. In an interdependent or non hegemonic system interests are often interconnected and these facets overlap. In reality the political sphere is larger and more encompassing then realism defines it. Growing interdependencies correlate with a widening of the political sphere.
Regimes create coordination between these facets and allow states to cooperate within a widened sphere of political interest “In a world of sovereign states, the basic function of regimes is to coordinate state behavior to achieve desired outcomes in issue areas”12. This maximizes the potential and options available to the decision maker and creates a legitimate, issue coordinated venue for state interaction. The existence of this legitimate platform where states can interact not only improves state interaction but reduces transaction costs. “The nesting patters of international regimes affect transaction costs by making it easier to link particular issues”13.
Establishing widely accepted norms or behavior and coordinating among diverse issue areas to maximize decision making helps provide structure in an anarchic environment. The notion that this structure or restrictive nature of regimes yield to beneficial outcomes corresponds to Kranser’s third category of regime significance and the “modified structural” position regarding the benefits a regimes restrictive nature has on an anarchic world14.
Regime Cooperation Yields Maximum Power
A states ultimate objective is survival. States will unilaterally pursue their interests in terms of power often with disregard for moral standards. Morgenthau would explain that morality is a different “sphere” than politics “the political realist maintains the autonomy of the political sphere, as the economist, the lawyer, the moralist maintain theirs”15. However, this makes states untrustworthy and contributes to a world of anarchy. States however, which have a common interest in regime cooperation limit anarchy by adhering to norms and principles of regimes.
Realism incorporates the notion that states are responsible for their own security. Realists define power as “mans control over influence of other men”; this influence is defined by the “existence of expectations of benefits and the fear of disadvantage”.16 By cooperating and adhering to regimes security interest often become a mutual interest between states. This is because in regimes, often a threat to one states security is a threat to the interest or security of another. States will avoid taking action against another state if it has a negative outcome to their own self interest.
This concept can be supported by the notion of Democratic Peace which has been called “the closest concept to imperial law” in regards to International Relations17. In Democratic Peace theory, norms and institutions of democracy and economic interdependence allow states to share same benefits and disadvantages18.This interdependence limits anarchy by creating norms of behavior where the rational actor would be at a detriment in imposing on the security of another state. The existence of this detriment increases one states influence over the other in terms of security interests. This control and influence is power.
Realists explain legitimate power as power that is morally and legally justified19. Morgenthau maintains that legitimate power is more effective than illegitimate power20. Without regimes, the use of force will often become subjective and be perceived as illegitimate. Adherence to regimes objectifies the use of force and increases the likelihood of the legitimate use of force. Thus regimes increase the effectiveness and efficiency of the use of force.
Perceptions of Objective Reality support Neoliberal Institutionalism
Since Neoliberal Institutionalism and Realism both identify with the same assumptions regarding state behavior, support for Neoliberal Institutionalism can be better understood by examining the role of perceptions in international politics. Here, it is important to understand the role perceptions have on state behavior. Jervis supports the notion of an objective reality. Jervis’ two step model establishes that altered perceptions do influence policy or behavior and that identifying the sources of these different perceptions is necessary in understanding altered perceptions21.
Adhering to Jervis’ two step model is helpful in explaining the growth of Neoliberal Institutionalist theory. Neoliberal Institutionalism and Realism differ in perception of the international system. Realist interpretation of international system is a misconception perhaps derived and built upon the ideal types of history or from a previous outdated political system. In reality, the existence of interdependencies and transnational institutions support the notion that Neoliberal Institutionalist theory is closer to objective reality. Interdependencies and transnational actors have changed the structure of the international system. Perceptions that have changed and adapted to this newly defined structure support the notions of Neoliberal Institutionalism.
This correlates with the notion that anarchy is due to process and not structure and that “anarchy is what states make of it”22. Rules and norms of institutions are created endogenously through societal socialization. The socialization of rules and norms is what changes perceptions23. Realist’s perception of regimes as extensions of self help and failure to recognize importance of regimes in terms of cooperation is largely because of this lack of socialization.
Conclusion
In an anarchic world, regimes improve interactions between states. Other, critics of Neoliberal Institutionalists outside the Realist framework might include dependency theorists, whom would argue that regimes reinforce power inequalities by allowing strong to exploit the weak24 . Strange incorporates this notion into her fifth critique of regimes in maintaining that they are “narrow minded, limited in state centric paradigm that limits the vision of a wider reality”25. However, even in a non hegemony strong and weak states exist and so will power inequalities between them. In fact, regimes help provide balance by establishing norms of behavior, increasing decision making capabilities and minimizing interaction costs. These are especially helpful to weak actors whom have to interact with larger more powerful states.
In examining an anarchic international system, it is important to study the interactions of states. This makes Realism and Neoliberal Institutionalism the predominant theories of international relations. However, the existence of interdependencies in the international system has made cooperation the prominent interest of state behavior. Where Realism and other theories of international relations fail to acknowledge significance of regime cooperation, creating a misconception of objective reality; Neoliberal Institutionalism acknowledges that regimes facilitate cooperation. This makes Neoliberal Institutionalism the single most important theory of international relations. Regimes not only allow states to pursue and realize their interest in cooperation, but cooperation within regimes helps to control anarchy by limiting uncertainties and maximizing options available to the decision maker. In addition, the existence of mutual interest and mutual disadvantages help deter the illegitimate use of force. These benefits are derived from the restrictive nature of regimes. The consequences of anarchy are greater with interdependency, thus limiting anarchy is crucial in establishing stability in an evolving interdependent and non hegemonic international system.
1 “Politics Among Nations”, H.J Morgenthau, K.W. Thompsan; Miller Center for Public Affairs, 1985, pg.10
2 “After Hegemony; Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy” R. Keohane, Princeton University Press, NJ 1984, pg.8
3 “Politics Among Nations”, H.J Morgenthau, K.W. Thompsan; Miller Center for Public Affairs, 1985, pg.10
4 “After Hegemony; Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy” R. Keohane, Princeton University Press, NJ 1984, pg.11
5 “After Hegemony; Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy” R. Keohane, Princeton University Press, NJ 1984, pg.54
6 “Politics Among Nations”, H.J Morgenthau, K.W. Thompsan; Miller Center for Public Affairs, 1985, pg.12
7 “Politics Among Nations”, H.J Morgenthau, K.W. Thompsan; Miller Center for Public Affairs, 1985, pg.12
8 “After Hegemony; Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy” R. Keohane, Princeton University Press, NJ 1984, pg.14
9 “After Hegemony; Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy” R. Keohane, Princeton University Press, NJ 1984, pg.14
10 “After Hegemony; Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy” R. Keohane, Princeton University Press, NJ 1984, pg.11
11 “Politics Among Nations”, H.J Morgenthau, K.W. Thompsan; Miller Center for Public Affairs, 1985, pg.13
12 “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences; Regimes as Intervening Variables”, Stephen D. Krasner (Agerwal), Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1982 pg.191
13 “After Hegemony; Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy” R. Keohane, Princeton University Press, NJ 1984, pg.91
14 “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences; Regimes as Intervening Variables”, Stephen D. Krasner (Agerwal), Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1982 pg.185
15 “Politics Among Nations”, H.J Morgenthau, K.W. Thompsan; Miller Center for Public Affairs, 1985, pg.13
16 “Politics Among Nations”, H.J Morgenthau, K.W. Thompsan; Miller Center for Public Affairs, 1985, pg.32-33
17 “The Classical Liberals Were Right: Democracy, Interdependence, and Conflict, 1950-1985”; John R. Oneal & Bruce M. Russett. International Studies Association, Blackwell Publishers, 1997
18 “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics; logic of two level games”, Putnam, World Peace Foundation, 1988, pg. 459-460
19 “Politics Among Nations”, H.J Morgenthau, K.W. Thompsan; Miller Center for Public Affairs, 1985, pg.34
20 “Politics Among Nations”, H.J Morgenthau, K.W. Thompsan; Miller Center for Public Affairs, 1985, pg.34
21 “Perception and Misperception in International Politics”, Jervis, Princeton University Press, 1976, pg.14
22 “Anarchy is what States Make of It; The Social Construction of Power Politics; Wendt, World Peace Foundation, 1992, pg. 394-395
23 “Anarchy is what States Make of It; The Social Construction of Power Politics; Wendt, World Peace Foundation, 1992, pg. 394-395
24 “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences; Regimes as Intervening Variables”, Stephen D. Krasner, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1982 pg.504
25 “Cave! Hic Dragones” A Critique of Regime Analysis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1982. pg.509