Understanding the Difficulties in Spreading Democracy and State Building

Understanding the Difficulties in Spreading Democracy and State-Building.
Perhaps the nearest concept to imperial law in international politics is the Theory of Democratic Peace. This theory states that dyad democratic relationships are relatively unlikely to engage in militarized confrontation (Oneal and Russett, 267)[i]. However, transitional democracies are known to be more violent, unstable and conflict prone. Democratic Peace is limited to relationships among mature democracies the process of democratization makes fledging democracies more prone to conflict (Oneal, Russett 270; [Mansfield and Snyder])[ii]. Premature institutions, lack of endogenous socialization of democratic norms, transitions in security systems and the presence of lags help explain the existence of instabilities during transitional democratic periods. Ultimately premature institutions yield power to ideological individual leadership which often acquires a radical orientation in attempt to pursue realization of a democratic reality.
Regimes facilitate Cooperation from discord
One role of institutions is its purpose in converting discord into cooperation where harmony does not exist (Keohane, 51-52[iii]).Accordingly; Democratic Peace requires the facilitation of regimes to establish cooperation necessary to create democratic peace. The institutions and regimes of transitional democracies often fail in facilitating cooperation, thus lending to the instability of transitional democracies.
Keohane explains international conflict as arising from interdependence, resulting from democratic states expansion abroad as a means of protecting their own domestic economic and security interests. Interdependence leads democratic governments to expand state activity in order to protect their own citizens (Keohane, P.5,6)[iv]. Autocratic or non democratic governments are often pressured exogenously to acquire democratic reforms. This is often referred to top down state building. When this process is established exogenously, it often results in discord. This discord manifests itself in the transitional democratic period.
In a non hegemonic system, states that share mutual interests and shared perceptions make cooperation possible through the facilitation of international regimes (Keohane, 56-57)[v]. Neo liberal Institutionalism would cite the absence of or lack in regime integration or coordination in transitional democracies to explain their conflict prone tendencies. Neoliberal Institutionalists agree that Democratic Peace is established through cooperation and shared interests but also through the incorporation of these factors into laws and institutions non hegemonic cooperation is possible, and that it is facilitated through international regimes (Keohane p.50)[vi]. While transitional democracies may identify common principles with other democracies, the institutions of a transitional democracy while still young and undeveloped are incapable of facilitating cooperation. The mere existence of common interests is not enough [for cooperation]: institutions that reduce uncertainty and limit asymmetries in information must also exist. (Keohane 12-13[vii]).
A Neoliberal Institutionalist systems level of analysis would define a regime as a set of mutual expectations, rules and regulations, plans, organizational energies and financial commitments which have been accepted by a group of states. (Keohane. P. 57 [Ruggiep. 570][viii]). In transitional Democracies the development of these regimes are also transitional and thus often ineffective in establishing cooperation, thereby resulting in discord.


Norms must be Endogenous
It is useful to mention here two of Kehoanes four components of the international regime; Principles and Norms. While during the transitional period democratic principles defined as the purposes that their members are expected to pursue(Keohane p.58) [ix]of a democracy can be established exogenously and may be clear and understood, democratic norms as standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations (Keohane, 57)[x] are unclear and often unaccepted by the transitional democracy. Later this paper will use Krasners notion of Lags to support how institutional norms play a role in the democratic transitional period but first it is important to make this point using constructivism.
The instability of transitional democracies is a cause of the underdeveloped and often confused institutions and structure of the state. Before democratic institutions can function successfully the ideals of democracy must be accepted and reflected endogenously; in the process and social interactions of that state. An institution is a relatively stable set or structure ofoften codified in formal rules and norms but these have motivational force only in the virtue of actors, socialization to and participation in collective knowledge (Wendt, 399)[xi]. Endogenous support for these institutions must exist to develop acceptance of democratic norms before these institutions become effective; Wendt maintains that is process not structure that create norms this is due to process not structure(Wendt, 294)[xii]. Standards of behavior and obligation must be produced within the system. Institutional norms cannot be established exogenously.
This explains why top down approach to democratic state building and polities that made the biggest change from complete autocracy to democracy present the greatest risk ([Mansfield and Snyder] in Oneal p.270[xiii]) meet more resistance resulting in more unstable and violent transitional democracies.
Security Systems dilemma
In order for dyad democratic relationships to be peaceful, democracies must identify positively with one another and acquire a collective security interest, this collective security system is based on shared and communal interest (Wendt. 400-401[xiv]). Autocratic or non democratic security systems often identify with a self help security system in regards to democratic states.
In Democratic Peace, democracies must have a cooperative security system and cannot have competitive or individualistic security systems. Acknowledgment of the theory of Democratic peace demands recognition that all democracies have cooperative security systems. Instability during transitional democracies could be explained through the transition of security systems, from a competitive or individualistic system where states identify negatively or indifferently to the others security, to the cooperative system of dyad democracies where states identify positively and cooperate in establishing security (Wendt p.400)[xv].
Transitional democracies must override an institutionalized competitive or individualistic security system before accepting a cooperative system. This requires social reconfiguration and intersubjective change (Wendt p.406-07[xvi]) which is seen here as a dialectical process formulating collective meaning only over time. Social organizations themselves are reproduced only in and through the orientations and practices of members engaged in social interactions over time(Wendt, [Culter] p.406[xvii]). This period of social reconfiguration parallels the democratic transition.
Lags
Exogenous attempts to establish behavioral norms create incongruencies during transitional democratic periods. This can be explained through the concept of lags. Krasner identifies three causes of lags; custom and usage, uncertainty and cognitive failing (Krasner, 501-502)[xviii]. During democratic transitions, custom and usage can be used to identify the presence of lags in the socialization of democratic norms while uncertainty or distrust helps to understand the presence of lags in regime security system transitions.
Lags and Norms
Custom and usage often cause a continuance of support for a well established regime well after it is gone; lags may arise from customs and usage (Krasner, 502)[xix]. Individuals often continue to adhere to certain regimes simply because they have done so in the past. In an international regime, altering the norms of behavior requires the reformatting of custom and usage. Since during democratic transitions, democratic norms often lack endogenous recognition, these norms are likely to reflect or revert to those of the previous system and not that of the newly developing democracy.
Lags and Security Systems
Lags also occur through uncertainty (Krasner. 502)[xx]. When environmental change occurs, actors often develop a lack of confidence in new regimes. Often they find themselves reverting to the principles of a previous regime because of this uncertainly regarding a newly established regime; actors may continue to accept an established regime because they are uncertain about the durability of environmental change (Krasner, [Stein] p.502)[xxi]. This would especially hold true in matters pertaining to security. Shifting from a competitive or individualistic security system to a cooperative system or from a self help security system to a collective relationship, requires that the actors are confident in the new security arrangement or that actors must be convinced that a new arrangement is both right and feasible (Krasner, 502)[xxii]. Lags occur when this confidence does not exist.
This can also be explained in terms of separate peace (Herman and Kegley. 516)[xxiii] and by utilizing the outgroup and ingroup ideology. Leaders of democratic peace and people in democratic political systems view other democracies as being like them part of their own group and political identity Political systems that are not democratic are viewed more suspiciously (Hermann and Kegley. P.-516-17)[xxiv] A transitional democratic leaders perspective of other states, both autocratic and democratic, is important in understanding state interactions during periods of transitional democracy. People are more acceptant to those who are familiar and similar and distance from those who are dissimilar (Hermann and Kegley, 516).[xxv]
Transitional democracies may not be perceived or perceive others as part of an out-group or in-group, but perhaps somewhere in between. In order to recognize an ingroup relationship there must be an endogenous socialization of Democratic norms. The recognition of democratic principles alone is not sufficient to create an ingroup mentality. Thus individual leadership during transitional democratic phases may not identify collectively with that of fully fledged democracies.

Weak Institutions empower individual leadership
The apparent illegitimacy and weakness in regime functions during democratic transitional periods create a necessity to understand unstable democratic transitions through an individual level of analysis. The existence of weak or illegitimate regimes empowers individual leadership. Even in full fledged democracies, during times of crisis, leaders and leadership become highly concentrated and centralized (Hermann and Kegley, 515-516)[xxvi]. Herman and Kegly use war to illustrate this point. The same argument can be made for democratic transitional periods
During war, the institutional and normative restraints usually operating in a democracy diminish. This increases individual leadership decision making power (Hermann and Kegly. 315)[xxvii]. Like in war, democratic transitions are often marked by crisis, thus being subject to similar lack of normative and institutional restraint. Under conditions of crisis, the differences between autocracies and democracies narrow (Hermann and Kegley, 516[xxviii]).
It is reasonable to expect institutions to impose constraints on a leaders capacity to initiate war institutions impose hurdles (Hermann and Kegly. 315)[xxix]. Where the effectiveness of institutions is limited by the transitional period, institutional restraints are limited and even transitional democratic leaders are more easily able to operate without restraint. While the ultimate outcome of this scenario would depend on the leaders perceptions and leadership styles, even leaders that accept democratic norms will hold high concentrations of authority. Thus, in transitional democracies, psychological outlook and individual levels of analysis become influential in understanding instable democratic transitions.
Transitional Democratic leadership is Ideological
Leadership can be divided into responsive leadership and ideological leadership. (Hermann and Kegley, 521-22)[xxx]. The former type rests on the setting, environment or nature of the state structure, while ideological leadership rests on a set of ideas, a cause, problem to be solved or an ideology (Herman and Kegley, 521-22)[xxxi] While democracies are more prone but not limited to having responsive leaders, more subject to restraints and public opinion (Herman and Kegley, 525), states in transitional democratic periods actively pursue an ideology of democracy and take on a more conflict prone ideological leadership. Ideological driven leaders are more likely to escalate towards war (Hermann and Kegley, 528)[xxxii]. Lack of institutional restraint and difference between perception and reality both contribute to the degrees of ideological leadership.
The lack of institutional restraint in transitional democracies yields stronger and often more extreme and ideological leadership. These leaders must overcome constraints to protect and strengthen newly established democratic institutions, overcome lags and establish socialization of endogenous democratic norms. The absence of consolidated democratic institutions during transitional phases of democracy allows leaders to pull policy making in their direction more effectively. Democratic leaders often feel justified in their covert behavior because they perceive the targets of being wavering in their commitment to democracy (Herman and Kegley, 526[xxxiii]). This lack of restraint creates little political competition and few restrictions on a leaders authority. When opposition or restraints are likely to occur or exist these leaders take on pragmatic or radical orientation towards responding to threats. (Herman and Kegley. 527)[xxxiv].
When differences between perceptions and reality exist decision making becomes crucial in the understanding of individual leadership styles it is useful to examine decision making if there are constant differences between the decision makers perceptions and reality(Jervis, 29[xxxv]); the greater the contrast between ideology and reality the greater the likelihood of extremity in leadership orientation. This contrast can be identified by the amount of resistance present in a transitional democracy. Resistance in a transitional democracy is measured by the effectiveness or maturity of its institutions, degree of endogenous socialization of norms and the severity of lags in norms and security systems.
While Democratic transitions begin with the perception and the recognition of democratic principles. Establishing a Democratic reality is a process. Understanding the limited functions of newly established democratic institutions, the importance of endogenous socialization and security outlooks and the causes of incongruence or lags during transitional periods help to identify the sources of these transitional democratic instabilities. Examining leadership roles helps to explain how ideological leadership emerges as a response to strengthening these limitations and consolidating democracy.